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HUMAN RIGHTS AS CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA
IN THE NEW CENTURY
Philip C. Akat
I. INTRODUCTION
Africa is a world region where conflict is rife. Many of the
conflicts that took place in the globe in the second part of the last
century occurred in the African continent.1 As one germane study
points out, "[e]ver since most of the region became independent in the
1960s there has been no point in time that a major war is not going on
somewhere in Africa. No single country in the continent has collapsed
entirely from violence ... but then not one country has also totally
escaped periods of militant or subversive strife."2 During the 1990s,
twenty-four of fifty-three countries in Africa experienced sustained
civil strife.3 Of forty-two peacekeeping missions in the world organized
by the United Nations as of 2000, thirteen, or little less than one-third
'Associate Professor of Political Science, Chicago State University; Vice Chair,
American Bar Association Committee on International Human Rights; Winner of the
Lawrence Dunbar Reddick Memorial Scholarship Award for the Best Article on Africa
Published in the Journal of Third World Studies, 2001. J.D., Temple University
School of Law; Ph.D., Howard University; M.A., University of North Texas; B.A.,
Edinboro University of Pennsylvania. This Article originated as a paper presented at
the Fourth Annual Turning of the Centuries Conference on the theme of
"Deconstructing Violence," held at Chicago State University on March 17-18, 2003.
1. There is need to segregate duration as I do here because modern Africa did not
become part of international relations until about the 1960s, in the latter half of the
century, when many African countries received political independence.
2. Philip C. Aka, The Military, Globalization, and Human Rights in Africa, 18
N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTs. 361, 388 (2002).
3. Crawford Young, Order and Disorder in Postcolonial Africa, in THE AFRICAN
STAKES OF THE CONGO WAR 13 (John F. Clark ed., 2002).
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of the overall number, took place in Africa.4 In the aftermath of the
terrorist attacks on the United States on September 11, 2001, the
issue of violence has acquired new saliency in discussions on
international affairs.5 However, long before those attacks, conflict
management became established as an accepted approach for the
understanding of African politics.
6
Many of Africa's conflicts produced ruinous consequences for
human rights. Three million Igbos were killed during the Nigerian
civil war (the Biafran war) from 1967 to 1970.7  Since then, an
4. See PETER CALVOCORESSI, WORLD POLITICS 1945-2000 app. at 845-46 (8th ed.
2001).
5. See, e.g., Richard Falk, The Aftermath of 9/11 and the Search for Limits: In
Defense of Just War Thinking, in THE NEW GLOBAL TERRORISM: CHARACTERISTICS,
CAUSES, CONTROLS 216 (Charles W. Kegley, Jr. ed., 2003); see, e.g., James Turner
Johnson, Just War Theory: Responding Morally to Global Terrorism, in id. at 223; see,
e.g., Loch K. Johnson, Strategic Intelligence: The Weakest Link in the War against
World Terrorism, in id. at 239; see, e.g., Yutaka Arai-Takahashi, Shifting Boundaries
of the Right of Self-Defense-Appraising the Impact of the September 11 Attacks on Jus
Ad Bellum, 36 INT'L LAW 1081 (2002); see also PERSPECTIVES ON TERRORISM: How 9/11
CHANGED U.S. POLITICS (Allan J. Cigler ed., 2002).
6. The Brookings Institutions based in Washington, D.C. unveiled an entire series,
Conflict Resolution in Africa Project, consisting of a multiplicity of publications,
among them: GOVERNANCE AS CONFLICT MANAGEMENT: POLITICS AND VIOLENCE IN
WEST AFRICA (I. William Zartman ed., 1996); SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY:
CONFLICT MANAGEMENT IN AFRICA (Francis M. Deng et al. eds., 1996); FRANCIS M.
DENG, WAR OF VISIONS: CONFLICT OF IDENTITIES IN THE SUDAN (1995); TERRENCE LYONS
& AHMED I. SAMATAR, SOMALIA: STATE COLLAPSE, MULTILATERAL INTERVENTION, AND
STRATEGIES FOR POLITICAL RECONSTRUCTION (1995); THOMAS OHLSON & STEPHEN JOHN
STEDMAN, THE NEW Is NOT YET BORN: CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA
(1994); MARINA OTTAWAY, SOUTH AFRICA: THE STRUGGLE FOR A NEW ORDER (1993);
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA (Francis M. Deng & I. William Zartman eds., 1991).
7. Philip C. Aka, Nigeria Since May 1999: Understanding the Paradox of Civil Rule
and Human Rights Violations under President Olusegun Obasanjo, 4 SAN DIEGO INT'L
L.J. 209, 221 (2003). The three million people killed represented a third of the Igbo
population at the time. Herbert Ekwe-Ekwe, Obasanjo's Obsession with Biafra
versus Facts of History, at http://www.usafricaonline.com/ekweekwe.biafra.html (last
visited Nov. 7, 2003). For all the negative ramifications wars have for human rights,
wars by themselves are not considered human rights violations. They become
moments for human rights atrocities when fought outside the terms of the Geneva
Convention, which stipulates provisions for the treatment of prisoners of war and
civilian populations, among other conditions for the "humane" conduct of war. In
contrast to these provisions, Nigerian federal troops incessantly and wantonly
bombed unarmed civilian targets, including open busy markets, and deliberately used
economic blockades and starvation as a weapon of war. This was the reason many
assessed the war as genocide. Even the sheer magnitude of the number of Igbos
killed (an estimated one third of the entire Igbo population) in and of itself would
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estimated nine million additional Africans have died from the
numerous ethnic and religious conflicts that have shaken the
continent to its roots.' This does not include countless hours of
human liberties denied, millions of people dislocated or made
refugees, 9 or the hundreds of millions of dollars of hard-earned
property destroyed' ° in a region that houses the largest number of
countries with the lowest per capita incomes in the world." Human
rights violations and outbreak of conflicts are two dilemmas in Africa
that feed on each other. Human rights atrocities can lead to conflict;
in turn, some past and current conflicts in the continent portend wide-
ranging ramifications for human rights. For example, an immediate
cause of the Biafran War was the pogrom in northern Nigeria of more
than one hundred thousand innocent Igbos. 12 The conflict, in turn, led
to massive violations of Igbo human rights. 13 Numerous factors, other
have made the war genocide. As Professor Ekwe-Ekwe correctly stated, "[nlo Igbo
family in the world escaped the immediate or long-term impact and consequences of
this holocaust." Id.
8. See Aka, supra note 7.
9. About 10 million out of an estimated 20-25 million internally displaced persons
and about 6 million out of an estimated 17 million refugees in the world are Africans.
About three million people became refugees or displaced as a result of the Biafran
war alone. Aka, supra note 2, at 389. One occurrence that illustrates Africa's dismal
refugee situation is the fact that a multilateral treaty on refugees occupies a central
place in the region's human rights system. The treaty came into being as far back as
1969. See Convention Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa,
Sept. 10, 1969, 1001 U.N.T.S. 45. In contrast, the premier instrument of the African
human rights system, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR)
entered into force only in 1986. See infra note 37 and accompanying text.
10. See, e.g., EGHOSA E. OSAGHAE, CRIPPLED GIANT: NIGERIA SINCE INDEPENDENCE 69
(1998); 2 A.H.M. KIRK-GREENE, CRISIS AND CONFLICT IN NIGERIA: A DOCUMENTARY
SOURCEBOOK JULY 1967-JANUARY 1970 178-83 (1971) (detailing the enormous
devastation of the Nigerian civil war); see also Francis M. Deng, Self-Determination
and National Identity Crisis: The Case of Sudan, in THE SELF-DETERMINATION OF
PEOPLES: COMMUNITY, NATION, AND STATE IN AN INTERDEPENDENT WORLD 253
(Wolfgang Danspeckgruber ed., 2002) (showing how the civil war in Sudan, which has
raged intermittently for over four decades, has served to turn the potentially rich
country into "now unquestionably one of the poorest countries in the world").
11. See infra notes 76-81 and accompanying text.
12. OSAGHAE, supra note 10, at 63 (estimating 80-100,000 casualties, not counting
"several thousands more wounded").
13. See OHA-NA-EZE NDI-IGBO, THE VIOLATIONS OF HUMAN AND CIVIL RIGHTS OF NDI
IGBO IN THE FEDERATION OF NIGERIA (1966-1999): A CALL FOR REPARATIONS AND
APPROPRIATE RESTITUTION 86-87 (1999) (submitting a claim of over M86 trillion, the
equivalent of over $86 billion as damages for those violations). Oha-na-eze Ndi-Igbo
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than wars, giving rise to conflicts in Africa include military coups and
other acts of political instability, and dictatorial governments. 14
African leaders devote enormous "energy, time, and resources ... to
meeting the exigencies of conflicts" that could have been more
constructively used to promote the material well-being of their
citizens. As former U.N. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali
poignantly couches, "Iclonflicts cast a dark shadow over the prospects
for a united, secure and prosperous" continent that Africans "seek to
create."'6
Although it is premature to say, there is little hope that the new
century will be any less conflict-ridden. As I write these words, a
bloody civil war involving eight countries - and, therefore,
appropriately viewed by some as "Africa's first World War"- rages inS 17
the Congo. The conflict has claimed more than two million lives,
destroyed liberties, and resulted in millions of people losing their
property and becoming dislocated or refugees. To change these tragic
statistics and minimize energies that now go into managing disputes,
African countries must reduce the levels of conflicts in their societies.
One way to achieve that reduction is improved human rights
protection. Improvement in the continent's human rights record will
have a salutary effect on its conflict resolution capacity in the new
century.
This article explores the relationship between human rights and
conflict resolution in Africa. Specifically, it argues for improved
human rights as a tool for effective management of conflicts in Africa
and presents the model of and modalities for a human rights approach
to conflict resolution in the continent in the new century that is built
on democracy and consists of five other constituent elements. Part II.
provides a definition of human rights. Part III. examines the history
of human rights in Africa for the period through the end of the Cold
War, and Part IV. examines the period since the end of that War.
is a body that calls itself "the apex organization of the entire Igbo people." Ndi Igbo
means "Igbo people" in the Igbo language.
14. See Aka, supra note 2, at 386-88, 405-14.
15. Francis M. Deng, Reconciling Sovereignty with Responsibility: Basis for
International Humanitarian Action, in AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS: THE AFRICAN
STATE SYSTEM IN FLux 353, 356 (John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild eds., 3d ed.
2000) (quoting Boutros Boutros-Ghali, Address before the Council of Ministers in
Dakar, Senegal (1992)) [hereinafter AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS].
16. Id.
17. See Paul Salopek, Torrents of Civil War Pound Ravaged Congo Nation of Riches
Impoverished by Legacy of Greed, CHI. TRIB., Dec. 10, 2000, at 1.
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Part V. unveils the comprehensive human rights approach the article
develops for improving human rights and minimizing conflicts in
African societies in the new century.
II. DEFINING HUMAN RIGHTS
Human rights are freedoms or guarantees, such as life, liberty,S 18
security, and subsistence to which people as humans have rights.
They are generally understood as claims against the state (the
government) or society held equally by all persons simply because
they are human beings. 9 Although freedom is an idea common to all
civilizations, human rights in the format as known today is a notion of
recent vintage that dates back only to 1945 with the institution of the
U.N. system. Human rights "are usually taken to have a special
reference to the ways in which states treat their own citizens," 21 but
life, liberty, security, property and other freedoms to which people
have human rights "may be denied by an extensive array of
individuals and organizations."2
18. JACK DONNELLY, INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 1 (2d ed. 1998).
19. id.
20. See Aka, supra note 2, at 375-76. Although I date the development of the
modern concept to 1945, 1, by no means, take a rigid view of the process. I am aware
that human rights scholars such as Professor Umozurike talk about a "progressive
international of human rights" that dates back to the First World War. See U. OJI
UMOZURIKE, THE AFRICAN CHARTER ON HuMAN AND PEOPLES' RIGHTS 11 (1997).
21. See DONNELLY, supra note 18, at 1; see also MARK R. AMSTUTZ, INTERNATIONAL
ETHICS: CONCEPTS, THEORIES, AND CASES IN GLOBAL POLITICS 71 (1999). Human
rights are "expressed fundamentally as claims of individuals against the state." Id.;
see Jack Donnelly, Unfinished Business, 30 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 530 (1998) ("Human
rights.., typically target the state of which one is a national."); see Louis Henkin,
The Universal Declaration and the U.S. Constitution, 30 PS: POL. SCI. & POL. 512,
513 (1998) (emphasizing the national character of international human rights and
maintaining that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights "calls on states to
recognize the rights of their inhabitants under their national laws, and to take
measures to realize human rights through national institutions within their own
societies"). Conceptually speaking, human rights is simply the "form in which the
international community, under Western influence, has chosen to express human
dignity .. " Virginia A. Leary, The Effect of Western Perspectives on International
Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES 15, 29-30
(Abdullahi A. An-Na'im & Francis M. Deng eds., 1990). Although a concept with a
Western origin, human rights is also so evolutionary and dynamic that today it is
recognized and accepted through the world as a universal term. Id.
22. DONNELLY, supra note 18, at 1; see, e.g., Paul Redmond, Transnational
Enterprise and Human Rights: Options for Standard Setting and Compliance, 37
INT'L LAW. 69 (2003); see also Steven R. Ratner, Corporations and Human Rights: A
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Governments have a "first responsibility" for securing these
rights,23 including creating necessary conditions for the effective
24
enjoyment of all rights guaranteed for their citizens. No genuine
development takes place at the expense of human rights.25  Rather,
today the "true standard" of a society is measured by the extent to
26
which its leaders observe human rights, and the level of a country's
development is measured "by the extent to which its citizens enjoy
human rights in all their ramifications. 27 Eloquent arguments have
been made for the reconstruction of the doctrine of sovereignty in a
manner that tempers sovereignty with responsibility in matters
Theory of Legal Responsibility, 111 YALE L.J. 443 (2001); see also ANDREW CLAPHAM,
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PRIVATE SPHERE (1993); see also Mary Robinson, The Business
Case for Human Rights, at http://www.unhchr.ch/huricane/huricane.nsf/0/
e47d352dedc39697802566de0043b28e?OpenDocument (last visited Nov. 7, 2003).
23. LARRY DIAMOND, DEVELOPING DEMOCRACY TOWARD CONSOLIDATION 4 (1999)
(quoting the text of the Declaration and Program of Action adopted by participants at
the conclusion of the Second World Conference of Human Rights held in Vienna in
1993); see also Fildrtiga v. Pefia-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980) (holding that a
government's torture of its own citizens, perpetrated under color of state authority,
violated universally-accepted principles of international law). The International
Court of Justice (or the World Court) has ruled that the principles and rules
concerning basic human rights are binding on all states. See Case Concerning the
Barcelona Traction, Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) 1970
I.C.J. 3, 32, para. 34. The notion that governments exist to protect the human rights
of their citizens is not a novel idea, but rather one that goes back in time. For
example, the American Declaration of Independence states that governments became
"instituted among Men" to secure the "inalienable Rights" of individuals, including
"Life, Liberty and the Pursuit of Happiness." THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE
para. 2 (U.S. 1776). According to the document, "wherever any form of Government
becomes destructive of these Ends, it is the Right of the People to alter or to abolish it
and to institute new Governments, laying its foundation on such Principles and
organizing its Powers in such Form, as to them seem most likely to effect their Safety
and Happiness." Id.
24. See Declaration on the Right and Responsibility of Individuals, Groups and
Organs of Society to Promote and Protect Universally Recognized Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms, G.A. Res. 53/144, U.N. GAOR, 53d Sess., U.N. Doc
A/RES/53/144 (1999).
25. See, e.g., Juan J. Linz & Alfred Stepan, Toward Consolidated Democracies, in
CONSOLIDATING THE THIRD WAVE DEMOCRACIES: THEMES AND PERSPECTIVES 14, 15
(Larry Diamond et al. eds., 1997) (insisting regimes should not be viewed as
democracies if they fail to respect the rights of individuals and minorities, among
other constitutional subversions, irrespective of how freely elected the regimes were
or the substantiality of their majority).
26. UMOZURIKE, supra note 20, at 5.
27. Id. at 7.
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relating to human rights and humanitarian assistance. Some
scholars have even gone further by interpreting the reconstructed
doctrine to mean not only that "governments are answerable
internationally within their borders for their citizens' enjoyment of
internationally defined human rights regimes,"29 but also that "major
states and international organizations" can become "active partners of
governments in making basic human rights part of the working
foundations of contemporary states. ' 30
Three distinct categories of human rights identified in the
literature are political-civil rights; social, economic, and cultural (or
socioeconomic) rights; and solidarity (or group) rights.3 Political-civil
rights are rights with which governments must not interfere. These
rights include the right to life, personal liberty, privacy and family
life, the right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion; freedom
of expression and the press, peaceful assembly and association; and
28. See Deng, supra note 15, at 353-78; see generally DENG, SOVEREIGNTY AS
RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 6. Deng argued that sovereignty has evolved in our time
"to prescribe democratic representation" and "to justify outside intervention" when
humanitarian crisis arises due to a failure to meet this standard. He maintains that
a government should not claim sovereignty if it is not able to establish legitimacy by
meeting minimal standards of good governance and responsibility for the security and
general welfare of its citizens. Deng, supra note 15, at 357. Deng elaborates,
Sovereignty is not merely the right to be undisturbed from without,
but the responsibility to perform the tasks expected of an effective
government .... The obligation of the state to preserve life-
sustaining standards for its citizens must be recognized as a
necessary condition of sovereignty .... The state has the right to
conduct its activities undisturbed from the outside when it acts as
the original agent to meet the needs of its citizens .... If the
obligation is not performed, the right to inviolability should be
regarded as lost, first voluntarily as the state itself asks for help from
its peers, and then involuntarily as it has help imposed on it in
response to its own inactivity or incapacity and to the unassuaged
needs of its own people.
DENG, SOVEREIGNTY AS RESPONSIBILITY, supra note 6, at xviii; see also UMOZURIKE,
supra note 20, at 7 (contending that concern for human rights does not negate the
principle of non-interference in a country's domestic affairs because "breaches of
human rights, especially gross breaches, are taken out of domestic jurisdiction").
29. John W. Harbeson & Donald Rothchild, The African State and State System in
Flux, in AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 15, at 11.
30. Id.; see also Redmond, supra note 22, at 70 (maintaining that protecting human
rights "is too important to be left to national governments exclusively but is a matter
of joint, global responsibility").
31. See Aka, supra note 2, at 371-75 (containing a more detailed discussion of these
three categories of rights); see also Aka, supra note 7, at 212-15.
2003]
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freedom of movement. In the U.S., many of these rights are
denominated "civil liberties. 32  Socioeconomic rights are material-
based rights that require governmental preparation for the enjoyment
of these rights. Without such preparation, the realization of these
rights is made difficult or impossible. These rights include the right
to education; right to work, including protection against
unemployment; right to form and join trade unions; and right to social
security, among other rights.3 ' Solidarity, or group rights, are rights
which the individual may enjoy as a member of a particular society.
These collective rights include the equality of peoples, the right to
existence and self-determination, the right to free disposal of natural
wealth and resources, the right to development, the right to
international peace and security, and the right to a clean1 4
environment. The three categories of rights are denominated,
respectively, first-generation, second-generation, and third-generation
rights. Each of the generations complements and completes the
others. Ranking them by generation does not imply that any category
of rights is superior to or takes precedence over the others.35
Finally, human rights include individual rights and collective
rights. Political-civil rights and socioeconomic rights are individual
rights that may also be enjoyed by groups; and solidarity rights, like
the rights to peace, development, a clean environment, and the right
to self-determination, are group rights that individuals may also
enjoy. Accordingly, international human rights instruments, such as
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)" and the African
32. See, e.g., LARRY BERMAN & BRUCE ALLEN MURPHY, APPROACHING DEMOCRACY 460-
499 (2d ed. 1999).
33. Based on the definition here, guarantees denominated "civil rights" in the U.S.,
such as the right to equality under the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S.
Constitution would come under socioeconomic rights, but a right such as equality
under the law is considered political-civil rights in the international human rights
literature. See Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 A (III), U.N.
GAOR, 3d Sess., at art. 7, U.N. Doc. A/810 (1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. This
occurrence illustrates the nature of the fine line that separates the various categories
of human rights as well as the interconnectedness of the rights.
34. CHRIS MAINA PETER, HUMAN RiGHTs IN AFRICA: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF THE
AFRICAN HUMAN AND PEOPLE'S RIGHTS CHARTER AND THE NEW TANZANIAN BILL OF
RIGHTS 59-69 (1990).
35. Aka, supra note 2, at 375 (noting the various generations of human rights
"highlight the evolution and mutual interdependence of these rights rather than
suggest that any category should have priority over the others").
36. See UDHR, supra note 33.
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Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (ACHPR)37 recognize both
individual and group rights.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA UP TO THE END OF THE COLD WAR
Africa is a continent with a long history of human rights
atrocities. Some of these atrocities, such as those that occurred
during the post-independence era, were self-inflicted, but a number
were atrocities brought upon the continent by outsiders. The trans-
Atlantic slave trade uprooted tens of millions of able-bodied African
men and women who were transported against their choice as slaves
to the New World. Few singular human experiences stand out as
congealed violations of individual and collective human rights the way
the slave trade did." One lingering legacy of the ignominious trade in
humans is the ubiquitous spread of blacks today in parts of the world
outside Africa, many of which are places where they are victims of
discrimination, segregation or related maltreatments due to their skin
color or previous condition of servitude.39
Another moment of large-scale violation of African human rights
occurred during the colonial period starting from 1884-85,40 and
ending with the independence of Namibia in 1990.41 Colonial rule was
37. African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, June 27, 1981, 21 I.L.M. 58
(entered into force Oct. 21, 1986) [hereinafter ACHPRI.
38. See UMOzURIKE, supra note 20, at 16-17 (summarizing the sufferings of a slave
from capture until arrival to the New World, assuming the slave gets there alive, and
the massive destruction the slave trade wreaked on African life and society). There
are some who would challenge the assertion that the slave trade was something
imposed upon Africa by outsiders, arguing, for example, that Africans were partners
in the trade. However, although some Africans were partners in the tragic trade,
Africans were above all victims of the trade. Elikia M'Bokolo, Who Was Responsible?,
in GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA 201-3 (F. Jeffress Ramsay ed., 7th ed. 1997). In short, the
venture was a "one-sided relationship founded and maintained [by Europe] on the
threat of force." Id. at 202.
39. See generally Ali A. Mazrui, Global Africa: From Abolitionists to Reparationists,
37 AFR. STUD. REV. 1-18 (1994); see generally ANDREW HACKER, TWO NATIONS: BLACK
AND WHITE, SEPARATE, HOSTILE, UNEQUAL (1992) (focusing on the treatment of blacks
in the U.S.).
40. This was the date of the Berlin conference at which the European powers divided
Africa among themselves, incredibly, invoking human rights! See UMOZURIKE, supra
note 20, at 20.
41. A legitimate question might be: What about South Africa whose taste of freedom
came in 1994 after Namibia's? However, South Africa became independent in 1910,
even though it continued to be ruled by a white minority government that excluded
and segregated black South Africans who were, and still are, in the majority. What,
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a frontal assault on every category of human rights. Repressive
practices like forced labor, forced taxation, and the use of sedition
laws as a weapon designed to stamp out opposition to foreign rule and
impede the evolution of a free press marked its negation of political-
42
civil rights. Colonial governance was also an attack on
socioeconomic rights because foreign rule is inconsistent with any
meaningful notion of economic development. 43 Lastly, colonial rule
contradicted solidarity rights because foreign rule violated the rights
of Africans to determine for themselves rather than have foreigners
determine for them.44 In the apt language of one analyst, "[tihe entire
architecture of colonial rule, like that of military rule down the road
in the continent, was built and maintained solely and completely on
naked force designed to crush any and every 'native' resistance to
external domination.
' 5
The nationalist leaders fought for and won political independence
for their countries by invoking the vocabulary of human rights,6 only
to turn around, once gaining the opportunity to govern these new
countries, to abuse the rights of their citizens, at times with impunity.
In the guise of protecting their country's "hard-won" independence,
these new leaders curtailed citizen political participation, broke every
form of legitimate opposition to their rule, and turned the multiparty
systems in place when their countries became independent into one-
party dictatorships. 7 In countries where civilian "big men" did not
hold sway, another equally oppressive brand of dictatorship prevailed,
namely military rule.48 "By the late 1960s, about two-fifths of African
states had come under military rule and coups had effectively
replaced elections as a method for changing government in the
continent.', 9  The disease of power concentration in few political
hands that marked this period is evinced in the fact that only a few
countries, such as Nigeria, had constitutions that provided for a
therefore, South Africa achieved in 1994 was majority rule, not political
independence.
42. See Aka, supra note 2, at 380, 382.
43. See id. at 381.
44. See id.
45. Id. at 379 (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 395.
47. See, e.g., id. at 386-88.
48. Aka, supra note 2, at 405-14.
49. Id. at 406.
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federal system of government.50 A common feature characterizing
these dictatorial rules was poor economic records. Unlike their
counterparts in Asia that used authoritarianism to build the economy,
African dictators produced slow or negative economic progress.5' They
"canvassed the primacy of socioeconomic over civil-political rights, but
achieved the dubious distinction of promoting neither category of
rights.""2  Africa faced a crisis during the long night of
authoritarianism, which was characterized by weak agricultural
growth; a decline in industrial output; poor export production;
disintegration of productive and infrastructure facilities; huge foreign
debt; deteriorating social indicators and institutions, especially in
education, public health and sanitation, housing, and portable water;
environmental destruction; and economies that grew below the rate of
population."3
In retrospect, part of the failure of "development" that took place
during the post-independence period in Africa flowed from the fact
that African leaders were supposed to change the nature of the state
from the colonial period but instead mounted power at independence
without effecting that change. In many parts of the continent, the
state "presented itself as an apparatus of violence," experienced a
contraction in its "social base," and "relied for compliance on coercion
rather than authority,"' 4 comparable to the colonial government it
replaced, among other negative features. Rather than use the power
of the state to seek social transformation or development, African
leaders preferred to use it to achieve political domination. 5  After
50. See Ali A. Mazrui, The Bondage of Boundaries, 150 ECONOMIST YEARS 28 (1993).
I am grateful to Professor Opoku Agyeman of Montclair State University, New
Jersey, for drawing my attention to this article.
51. Aka, supra note 2, at 387. Scholars like the late Claude Ake questioned the
hypothesis postulating positive relationship between authoritarianism and
development. See CLAUDE AKE, DEMOCRACY AND DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA 127 (1996)
(contending that "[a] case for authoritarianism's being positively correlated to
development does not really arise, because democracy is part of the very meaning of
political development").
52. Aka, supra note 2, at 387-88.
53. Virginia DeLancey, The Economies of Africa, in UNDERSTANDING CONTEMPORARY
AFRICA 91, 103-05 (April A. Gordon & Donald L. Gordon eds., 2d ed. 1996). Economic
growth is not, as Professor DeLancey correctly pointed out, economic development.
However, the goals of economic development can be difficult to achieve if economic
growth is slow, especially when accompanied by rapid population growth, as is often
the case in many African countries. Id. at 102-03.
54. AKE, supra note 51, at 3.
55. Id. at 42.
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decades of corruption and governmental misrule, the chickens finally
came home to roost: a study published in 1991 found that Africa was
enduring an "economic catastrophe" that "dwarfs the Great
Depression" and that as of 1990, Africans in most black African
countries were much worse off than they were during the 1960s. 1
Various occurrences within and outside Africa conspired to
reinforce the prevailing unsatisfactory conditions. From within
Africa, this included the foundation of the Organization of African
Unity (OAU) that tolerated human rights atrocities under the guise of
doctrines such as respect for the "territorial integrity" of African
artificial boundaries and non-interference in the domestic affairs of
other countries. 7 Mouthing these doctrines, the OAU stood helplessly
as a genocidal war claimed the lives of three million Igbos in Nigeria
from 1967 to 1970.58 As one perceptive study correctly points out,
during this period, "[t]he rights of black Africans inside the borders of
independent African states appear[ed] to be of little real concern to
the OAU." 9 Abroad, developed countries provided moral comfort and
financial support to African dictators, such as Mobutu Sese Seko, who
committed human rights atrocities so long as these dictators
remained in their camp in the ideological Cold War rivalry between
the U.S. and the Soviet Union.0
IV. HUMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA SINCE THE END OF THE COLD WAR
In this section, the focus is on the first two categories of human
rights: namely, political-civil rights and socioeconomic rights. Left
out are solidarity rights, which are tied inextricably to political
restructuring, especially the right to self-determination. Solidarity
rights will return in Part V. in the discussion of restructuring and
56. See Philip C. Aka, Leadership in African Development, 14 J. THIRD WORLD STUD.
213, 224 (1997). The complexity of the continent and the numerosity of over fifty
countries that comprise it guarantee that some countries, such as Botswana,
Mauritius, and the Gambia, which managed to maintain democratic rule would do
well, but these countries were so few and so small-sized to have any impact on the
generally negative pattern of events.
57. See Aka, supra note 2, at 395.
58. See LEE C. BUCHHEIT, SECESSION: THE LEGITIMACY OF SELF-DETERMINATION 103-
04 (1978).
59. RHODA E. HOWARD, HUMAN RIGHTS IN COMMONWEALTH AFRICA 5 (1986).
60. See Warren Christopher, U.S.-Africa: A New Relationship, 38 AFR. REP. 36
(1993) (admitting that American policies became "often determined not by how they
affected Africa, but by what advantage they brought to Washington or Moscow"). Mr.
Christopher was Secretary of State under President William J. Clinton until 1993.
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collective or group rights. After decades of often conflict-ridden
(mis)rule and numerous ruined economies, African societies moved
into a new era of democratization and increased respect for human
rights beginning in 1989. Although home-grown, the occurrence
coincided with numerous changes in the international system: among
them, the end of the Cold War, the demise of socialism in the Soviet
Union and Eastern Europe, as well as the breakup of the Soviet
Union and the wearing off of the global appeal of communism .61 From
a human rights perspective, characteristic features of this new era for
Africa included the independence of Namibia, achievement of majority
rule in South Africa, and the evolution of a full system of human
rights for Africa symbolized by the coming into force in October 1986
62
of the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights. Another
important feature was the embrace of multi-partyism by a vast
majority of African states.63 By the end of 1994, thirty-eight of forty-
seven countries in sub-Saharan Africa had held competitive
multiparty elections, and the number of democracies in the region
increased to eighteen from just three in 1988.64 By 1995, over twenty
65African countries legalized political opposition.
Despite the wind of democratic change and the apparent
banishment of authoritarian rule in Africa, there is still little
substantive human rights progress registered. This amazing
occurrence is due to the questionable democratic credentials of a
number of the governments that came into office in the 1990s,66 as
well as to the fact that in many countries, "democracy" existed
uncoupled with respect for human rights.67 Not only is there a well-
61. See, e.g., JOHN A. WISEMAN, THE NEW STRUGGLE FOR DEMOCRACY TN AFRICA 1-14,
35-83 (1996).
62. See generally Aka, supra note 2, at 391-96.
63. See WISEMAN, supra note 61, at 15-34.
64. See Aka, supra note 2, at 391; see also WISEWAN, supra note 61, at 20-31.
65. Id.
66. See, e.g., MARINA OTTAWAY, AFRICA'S NEW LEADERS: DEMOCRACY OR STATE
RECONSTRUCTION? (1999); see also Marina Ottaway, From Political Opening to
Democratization?, in DEMOCRACY IN AFRICA: THE HARD ROAD AHEAD 1-14 (Marina
Ottaway ed., 1997); see also Michael G. Schatzberg, Highjacking Change: Zaire's
"Transition" in Comparative Perspective, in id. at 113-134; see also Christopher
Clapham, Democratization in Africa: Obstacles and Prospects, 14 THIRD WORLD Q.
423, 434 (1993) (discussing the coopting of democratization as a device for retaining
control in C6te d'Ivoire under President Houphouet-Boigny and Kenya under Daniel
arap Moi).
67. See generally Aka, supra note 7; see also Akwasi Aidoo, Africa: Democracy
Without Human Rights?, 15 HUM. RTS. Q. 703 (1993).
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grounded feeling now that the movement toward democracy and
human rights has stalled,8 but democracy scholars, like Professor
Clapham, view the prospects for continued democracy in the continent
as "extremely uncertain."69  "By 1997, the number of regimes
denominated democracies in Africa decreased from the high
watermark of 18 in 1994 to only 13.7 ' These unsatisfactory outcomes
cannot but call to mind Professor Donnelly's warning several years
ago about the danger of overestimating the "human rights
significance" of the ongoing democratization in the world, particularly
that "we must not confuse decreased tolerance for old forms of
repressive rule with support for, let alone institutionalization of,
rights-protective regimes.'
The picture appears equally gloomy for socioeconomic rights.
One of the most pressing issues since the 1980s that has affected
African economies and societies is the Acquired Immunodeficiency
Syndrome (AIDS) along with the virus, human immunodeficiency
virus (HIV), that causes the condition. The pandemic exerts a heavy
72toll on African life expectancy, wreaks havoc on human
development 73 and productivity74 in the region, particularly in Sub-
Saharan Africa, and is partly responsible for the increasing economic
disparity between Africa and other world regions.72
68. OTTAWAY, supra note 66, at 1-14; see, e.g., WISEMAN, supra note 61, at 156-77
(dwelling on the uncertain future of democracy in Africa and, therefore, the grounds
for cautious optimism regarding progress toward democracy in the continent).
69. Clapham, supra note 66, at 437.
70. Aka, supra note 2, at 391-92.
71. DONNELLY, supra note 18, at 157.
72. See UNITED NATIONS DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM, HUMAN DEVELOPMENT REPORT
1999 42 (1999), available at http://hdr.undp.org/reports/global/1999/en/ (last visited
Nov. 7, 2003) [hereinafter UNDPI. In 1999, the United Nations projected "[a] loss of
17 years in life expectancy for the nine countries in Africa with a HIV prevalence of
10 % or more.., down to 47 years by 2010, back to the life expectancy of the 1960s."
Id. These nine countries are Botswana, Kenya, Malawi, Mozambique, Namibia,
Rwanda, South Africa, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. Id.
73. See id. at 128, 130.
74. See DeLancey, supra note 53, at 113-14. DeLancy includes a listing of negative
impacts which include, but are not limited to: dramatic decrease in family income and
alteration of the division of labor in families; negative effect on educational chances
and other areas relating to quality of life for children; profound impact on the supply
of labor and reduction in the size and productivity of the labor force; and a dramatic
increase in the health care budget of many countries, emanating from increased
hospital bills and the cost of education campaigns to prevent the pandemic.
75. See UNDP, supra note 72, at 128 (conveying that Sub-Saharan Africa has more
than twice as far to go as Latin America and the Caribbean).
[Vol. 11. 1
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA
Recent studies of African economies in the post-authoritarian
period paint a roundly negative picture of these economies with
negative ramifications for socioeconomic and other human rights. In
a piece designed to explore whether African economies may be on the
verge of a takeoff, Professor Brautigam concludes rather "for now
African countries will need years of rebuilding simply to reach the
point where they were in 1970," adding that "[a]n economic miracle of
the [Asian] 'tiger' variety still seems a long way off."76  It is a
conclusion Professor Callaghy appears to share, although he focuses
on another aspect of the same general problem. In his view, the
renaissance projected for Africa in the 1990s by international
financial institutions and others was something based on "a narrow
bed of sand" and premature.77 He predicts that "simultaneous
marginalization and dependence are likely to continue, and will
probably increase, for most countries."78 He concludes, in the very
language that forms the theme of his article, "Africa is even more
caught between a rock and a hard place in regard to the world
political economy, and all actors will have to work very hard to alter
that fact."79  Professor Clapham observes that there has been a
substantial shift in recent decades from agricultural products to
minerals as the major constituent of exports in Africa. He is,
however, quick to note that the overall dependence on primary export
trade has scarcely been affected. 8' He points out the "profound"
implications of this dependence for Africa, among them, a
76. Deborah Brautigam, Economic Takeoff in Africa, in GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA
180, 184 (F. Jeffress Ramsay ed., 8th ed. 1999).
77. Thomas M. Callaghy, Africa and the World Political Economy: More Caught
Between a Rock and a Hard Place, in AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 15, at 59-
61. Zeroing in on this theme of renaissance, Professor Nicolas van de Walle has
explained that the optimism about any renaissance arose from the significance given
the end of civil wars in the continent, specifically the notion that with the end of long-
standing conflicts in the Horn of Africa and southern Africa, "the continent might be
entering a period of political stability." Nicolas Van de Walle, Africa and the World
Economy: Continued Marginalization or Re-engagement, in AFRICA IN WORLD
POLITICS, supra note 15, at 278. Stated differently, the renaissance projected was
based on the notion that "[olvercoming the reputation of being a bad 'neighborhood'
was viewed as important to attracting private capital back to Africa. . . ." Id.
However, the renaissance became premature because of the outbreak of new conflicts
in Africa, among them the civil war in the two Congos, and a border war between
Ethiopia and Eritrea. Id.
78. Callaghy, supra note 77, at 78.
79. Id. at 80.
80. Clapham, supra note 66, at 427.
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deterioration in the region's already unfavorable terms of trade and
for economic management."'
Not every report on Africa's current economic health is pointedly
negative in tone. For example, two scholars jointly insist "[t]he future
of Africa is not yet written.., contemporary developments do provide
new bases for hope."8' 2 These contemporary developments suggest
progress toward sustainable development and include the move
toward democracy and human rights in the continent and the
transition to majority rule in South Africa. 3 However, apartheid left
a legacy of unfavorable disparities for blacks in all facets of life, with
far-reaching implications for human rights that the majority
government in South Africa struggles to overcome, 4 and, the
democratization movement appears to have run its course in many
countries in the continent. 5 Revealingly, the authors branded their
optimism as "tempered."S
A recurrent issue today in many proposals for economic change in
Africa is integration of the continent's small economies."87
Unfortunately, there is little progress registered. An important
recent study on regionalism among developing countries reported
little activities on the ground in the region, concluding "African
integration is further in the future than Latin American or Asian8 8
A useful compendious four-volume study by a distinguished team of
economists focusing on Sub-Saharan (or Black) Africa reached similar
conclusions regarding regional integration and trade liberalization in
the region.8 9 The study finds "the keen interest in regional economic
81. Id.
82. Richard Stryker & Stephen N. Ndegwa, The African Development Crisis, in
AFRICA 375, 392 (Phyllis M. Martin & Patrick O'Meara eds., 3d ed. 1995).
83. Id.
84. See Aka, supra note 2, at 390.
85. See supra notes 66-70 and accompanying text.
86. Stryker & Ndegwa, supra note 82, at 392.
87. PROSPECTS FOR RECOVERY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT IN AFRICA at xii, 320-
21 (Aguibou Y. Yansane ed., 1996); see, e.g., DeLancey, supra note 53, at 119; see also
Mazrui, supra note 50, at 29.
88. SHEILA PAGE, REGIONALISM AMONG DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 59 (2000). Page only
commented on the following regional organizations: the Southern African
Development Community (SADC), the African Economic Community (AEC), the
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), and the Economic
Communities of Western and Central African States (ECCAS). See id. at 59, 260.
89. See generally, REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SUBSAHARAN
AFRICA, VOLUME 1: FRAMEWORK, ISSUES, AND METHODOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES
(Ademola Oyejide et al. eds., 1997) [hereinafter REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE
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integration" in the region "has not been matched by results,"90
specifically that regional integration has largely failed in the region."
It explains that "[i ntra-regional trade remains low and economic
diversification and development have not materialized."92 Grandiose
integration schemes make little sense if there is poor commitment to
those schemes.93 The study recommends as a pointer to a better
future, which is interesting for a work of regionalism in Black Africa,
sound and credible policies at the national levels to drive integration
schemes, which policies, however, unfortunately, do not exist in many
African countries.94  In the area of trade liberalization, 5 the study
finds that although Black Africa has made "continuing episodic
process toward a more rational trade policy," progress is "faltering.
96
The study also finds the region still has ways to go in creating the
initial conditions of high human capital and better income disparity
that were "so important in producing a successful Asian-style
LIBERALIZATION IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA, VOLUME 1]; REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE
LIBERALIZATION IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA, VOLUME 2: COUNTRY CASE-STUDIES (Ademola
Oyejide et al. eds., 1999) [hereinafter REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE
LIBERALIZATION IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA, VOLUME 21; REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE
LIBERALIZATION IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA, VOLUME 3: REGIONAL CASE-STUDIES (Ademola
Oyejide et al. eds., 1999); REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN
SUBSAHARAN AFRICA, VOLUME 4: SYNTHESIS AND REVIEW (Ademola Oyejide et al. eds.,
1999) [hereinafter REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SUBSAHARAN
AFRICA, VOLUME 4].
90. Colin McCarthy, Regional Integration in SubSaharan Africa: Past, Present and
Future, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA,
VOLUME 4, supra note 89, at 12.
91. Id. at 43. According to one contribution, most of the regional organizations in
Africa are yet to achieve their objectives, and future prospects for meeting those
objectives are not good. See William Lyakurwa et al., Regional Integration in
SubSaharan Africa: A Review of Experiences and Issues, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION
AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA, VOLUME 1, supra note 89, at 180-
91.
92. McCarthy, supra note 90, at 43.
93. Id.
94. See William Lyakurwa et al., Regional Integration in SubSaharan Africa: A
Review of Experiences and Issues, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE
LIBERALIZATION IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA, VOLUME 1, supra note 89, at 177-91.
95. See Paul Collier et al., Evaluating Trade Liberalization: A Methodological
Framework, in id. at 306 (defining liberalization as "programmes [sic] targeted at
more open policies").
96. Sdamus O'C16ireacdin, SubSaharan Africa's Trade Liberalization Experience, in
REGIONAL INTEGRATION AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA, VOLUME 4,
supra note 89, at 70.
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interventionist export-oriented growth exchange."97 It points out that
trade liberalization is only one component in adjustment and over the
past years, African economies have found it more difficult to adjust
than have economies elsewhere. 98 More importantly, on the whole,
"employment levels have not been significantly affected by trade
liberalization measures."99
This section concludes the present picture of political-civil rights
and socioeconomic rights in Africa on a note of two observations. The
first is that, assuming African economies experienced a takeoff, there
is still the problem of a growing gap between the few rich and the
many poor, 00 a situation that does not bode well for the enjoyment of
socioeconomic and other human rights. Second, it should be noted
that changes in the economic context tie necessarily to changes in the
political front, reinforcing our argument about the interconnectedness
among the various categories of human rights and their
complementarity. To elaborate, Professor Brautigam stated that any
projected economic take-off for Africa, if and when it comes, will be
dependent on African governments being able to finally provide basic
infrastructure such as political stability, education, public health, andt.• 101
the rule of law. It is a position with which Professor Young appears
to agree. As Young points out, Botswana and Mauritius, the two
continuously democratic countries in Africa, also held the record forI. . 102
the most impressive economic development achievement.
V. MODEL OF AND MODALITIES FOR A HUMAN RIGHTS APPROACH TO
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA IN THE NEW CENTURY
Six strategies presented here for promoting human rights and
minimizing conflicts in Africa in the new century are (1) democracy,
(2) human rights education, (3) economic progress, (4) political
restructuring, (5) attention to collective (or group) rights, and (6)
necessity for external help. Following are explanations of the
97. Id. at 69.
98. Id.
99. Ademola Oyejide et. al., Introduction and Overview, in REGIONAL INTEGRATION
AND TRADE LIBERALIZATION IN SUBSAHARAN AFRICA, VOLUME 2, supra note 89, at 28.
100. See Aka, supra note 7, at 262-63 (focusing on Nigeria); see generally
DEVELOPMENT AND UNDERDEVELOPMENT: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INEQUALITY
(Mitchell A. Seligson & John T. Passe-Smith eds., 1998) (taking a global perspective).
101. BrAutigam, supra note 76, at 184.
102. See Crawford Young, Africa: An Interim Balance Sheet, in AFRICA: DILEMMAS OF
DEVELOPMENT AND CHANGE 341, 354 (Peter Lewis ed., 1998).
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strategies in the order presented. The measures of each illustrate,
rather than exhaust, all the possibilities.
A. Democracy
The first strategy that can be used in Africa in the new century to
promote human rights and minimize conflicts is democracy.
Democracy is defined colloquially as government of the people for the
people by the people, or government based on the consent of the
governed. 13 It is a system of government "in which the coercive
powers of the government are effectively constrained by the
constitution."1 4  A set of conditions any democracy must satisfy
includes: meaningful and extensive competition among individuals
and organized groups for governmental offices through regular, free
and fair elections; a highly inclusive level of political participation in
the selection of leaders and policies; entrenchment of basic
fundamental guarantees like free speech and free press; leader
accountability to the electorate; and existence of multiple channels
beyond parties, legislatures, and elections, for the representation of
citizen interests. 1°5 Although important, elections, competition,
inclusiveness, and other pluralistic features are not the only
constituent features of a democracy; rather, quality is also a key
ingredient in the definition of any democracy. In theory as in
practice, democracy is a dynamic notion that entails progressive and
widespread application of democratic principles that proceed apace
until "democracy becomes routinized and deeply internalized in social,
institutional, and even psychological life, as well as in political
calculations for achieving success."' 6
There are several senses in which democracy may serve to
promote human rights and contribute to conflict management. First
and foremost, democracy is the context for any promotion of human
rights. However, there is no guarantee that democracy will result in
103. See BERMAN & MURPHY, supra note 32, at 4 (depicting democracy, among other
things, as "rule by the ruled").
104. JOHN MUKUM MBAKU, INSTITUTIONS AND REFORM IN AFRICA: THE PUBLIC CHOICE
PERSPECTIVE 189 (1997).
105. See DIAMOND, supra note 23, at 7-17.
106. Linz & Stepan, supra note 25, at 16. All democracies are works in progress
rather than final destination. See also BERMAN & MURPHY, supra note 32, at 3
(crediting Vaclev Havel, former Czechoslovakia president, to the effect that even
democratic veterans like the U.S. do nothing but merely approach democracy). The
authors built the entire theme of this popular text on American government on this
famous notion.
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respect for human rights, since a supposedly democratic government
can exist uncoupled with any respect for human rights.10 ' Any talk
about human rights without democracy is meaningless. Human
rights atrocities are rampant during periods of military and other
types of dictatorship in Africa.'0 8 Democracy, on the other hand, can
spell "the absence of the pressures of illegitimacy and unaccountable
rule that sets the ground for the use of force" and abuse of human
rights.'0 9 As Larry Diamond correctly observes, "[tlhere is no better
way of developing the values, skills, and commitments of democratic
citizenship," including respect for human rights, "than through direct
experience with democracy, no matter how imperfect it may be."110
Democracy also holds the only chance for control over the military.
This is because "Ibly definition, democracy cannot be consolidated
until the military becomes firmly subordinated to civilian control and
solidly committed to the democratic constitutional order.""' Second,
democracy is the basis or foundation for any other strategy or
strategies for human rights progress. Talk of the other measures for
human rights improvement without democracy is less sensible.
Third, human rights, particularly those relating to political-civil
rights, are viewed as intrinsic to the definition of democracy.1
2
Finally, democracy is also, in its own right, a tool for
institutionalization of conflict management. "Its qualities of
inclusiveness, pluralism, and its sensitivity to uniqueness or
diversity, along with the bargaining, coalition building, and political
learning it spawns, make democracy" a good tool for conflict
management, particularly in an ethnic setting such as Nigeria."
3
One intriguing element about democracy in Africa during the
post-Cold War era is that although the continent still apparently
produces little of this commodity, the need and necessity for
democracy has also at the same time become more imperative. Any
effective system of government in Africa today must be more
democratic than in the past. As Professor Clapham explains, this is
because with the emergence of a new world order, political
107. See supra note 67 and accompanying text.
108. See Aka, supra note 2, at 386-88, 408-414.
109. Id. at 431-32.
110. DIAMOND, supra note 23, at 3.
111. Diamond, Introduction: In Search of Consolidation, in CONSOLIDATING THE THIRD
WAVE, supra note 25, at xxviii.
112. See, e.g., DIAMOND, supra note 23, at 7-17.
113. See Philip C. Aka, Nigeria: The Need for an Effective Policy of Ethnic
Reconciliation in the New Century, 14 TEMP. INT'L & COMP. L.J. 327, 351 (2000).
[Vol. 11.1
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA
conventions such as maintenance of artificial state boundaries,
popular acquiescence, and external backing, used in the past to
maintain non-democratic governments, have eroded to the point of no
return."' Professor Clapham notes correctly the old African state,
based on the hierarchies of rule inherited from European colonialism,
is on its way out, and any state structure succeeding this dying
formation must today rely more on popular support than in the
past.15 The choice open for African governments today, he believes is
between acquisition of popular legitimacy or collapse into anarchy.
116
If "the mighty Soviet Union breaks up into fifteen different
fragments, there is no way in which an artificial African state can
hold together unless most of its people want it to.""' 7
B. Human Rights Education
Another employable strategy that can be coupled with democracy
to improve human rights and minimize conflicts in Africa in the new
century is education. Education nurtures "a culture of respect and
demand for the appreciation and internalization of the values of
human right .... , Human rights education embodies the "dual
perspective of education as a human right [or the right to education],
and education about human rights."" 9 As the UDHR states, education
is "directed to the full development of the human personality and to
the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental
freedoms." 120  Human rights education is much more than just
information provision; rather, it "constitute[s] a comprehensive life-
long process by which people. .. learn respect for the dignity of others
and the means and methods of ensuring that respect in all
societies. 12' Education in human rights should inform citizens of
their rights; "lead to an understanding of, and sympathy for, the
concepts of democracy, justice, equality, freedom, solidarity, peace,
dignity, and rights and responsibilities; and build their awareness
114. Clapham, supra note 66, at 437.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 437-38.
117. Id.
118. UMOZURIKE, supra note 20, at 8.
119. Douglas Ray & Norma Bernstein Tarrow, Human Rights and Education:
Overview, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND EDUCATION 3 (Norma Berstein Tarrow ed., 1987).
120. UDHR, supra note 33, art. 26.
121. Aka, supra note 2, at 435 (quoting The U.N. Decade for Human Rights
Education, U.N. GAOR, 49th Sess., Agenda Item 100(b), at 2, U.N. Doc.
AIRES/49/184 (1995)).
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that oppressive laws and inappropriate traditions may be reformed,"• 122
among other acts of enlightenment.
While there is no uniform or universal content to that education,
the common core should include "familiarity with the main
international documents on human rights; people, movements, and
key events in the historical struggle for human rights; the main
categories of human rights, along with duties or obligations; and
attention to various forms of injustice, inequality, and incidents of
discrimination, including racism and sexism."123  As the U.N.
Commission on Human Rights states, the key is that "knowledge of
human rights, both in its theoretical dimension and in its practical
application.., be established as a priority in educational policies.' 24
Part of this education for soldiers is that they must accept civilian
control and subject themselves to such control and use whatever
coercive power they may have to protect their people, neither against
them nor to seize governmental control for themselves. 2'
C. Economic Progress
A third strategy, coupled with democracy and human rights
education, needed to promote human rights and reduce conflicts in
Africa in the new century is a certain level of material prosperity or
economic development. Violations can occur where, as in Nigeria
126from 1999 to 2003, no such economic progress occurs. Material
prosperity can engender popular commitment to democracy, without
which any talk about human rights is not sensible. As one recent
study of Nigeria finds, Africans are outcome-oriented in their support
of democracy. 127 From a more direct standpoint, socioeconomic rights,
pursued and achievable through economic development, are an




125. See id. at 435-36.
126. See Aka, supra note 7, at 268.
127. See Philip C. Aka, Education, Economic Development, and Return to Democratic
Politics in Nigeria, 18 J. THIRD WORLD STUD. 21, 22 (2001) (disclosing that agitation
in Nigeria for democratic rule "has something to do with the belief most Nigerians
held that the only government [that is] ... able to improve their lot is a
democratically-elected one"); see also Robert J. Mundt & Oladimeji Aborisade, Politics
in Nigeria, in COMPARATIVE POLITIcS TODAY: A WORLD VIEW 680, 727 (Gabriel A.
Almond et al. eds., 7th ed. 2000) (conveying that the attraction of democracy for
Nigerians is "its association with prosperity").
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development means a reduction in these rights with possible negative
spillover effect into political-civil rights and solidarity rights.
Experimentation with democratic government must produce material
benefits for ordinary people in Africa. Africans have every right to be
cynical about unproven "dividends of democracy" of the kind leaders,
like President Olusegun Obasanjo of Nigeria emptily mouth; since
independence in the 1960s, they have waited hopelessly for changes in
their lives that have never happened. There has to be a limit to
ordinary people's capacity for long-suffering and patience. Appeals to
the masses for patience and continued sacrifice are unwarranted and
less likely to be heeded if citizens believe that their contributions to
democracy are not leading to any improvement in their economic
circumstances.
D. Political Restructuring
A fourth strategy necessary for improving human rights and
reducing conflicts in Africa in the new century is political
restructuring. As the post-1999 Nigerian government shows, human
rights atrocities can still occur even under a nominally democratic
setting when due attention is not paid to political restructuring.28
For Africa, in the post-Cold War era and in the new century, the
ultimate and most pressing issue of political restructuring is the
correction of the region's colonially-bequeathed artificial boundaries
drawn arbitrarily by Europe - notably Britain, France, and Germany
- in 1885 at the Berlin Conference, without regard to historical or
ethnic-nationality considerations. Rather than coinciding with pre-
existing ethnic-nationality groups, African boundaries frequently
either divided ethnic groups and peoples between countries or lumped
together very different ethnic groups and peoples within the same
. 29
country. No single event other than the slave trade has had a more
lingering effect on African life than the Berlin Conference. 30 What
African leaders should have done to correct this problem, upon their
countries' independence, would have been to alter the boundaries to
coincide with existing ethnic groups.' However, save for a few
exceptional cases, such as Somalia, where adjustment of colonial
boundaries took place, these leaders left the inherited artificial
128. See Aka, supra note 7, at 269-73.
129. Clapham, supra note 66, at 424.
130. Makau wa Mutua, Redrawing the Map Along African Lines, THE BOSTON GLOBE,
Sept. 22, 1994, at 17.
131. Id.
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boundaries intact. 132 The OAU and the international community also
supported this orientation,33 fearing that any likely boundary
changes will open up a Pandora's box of ethnic troubles. Ironically,
however, more than a few of the wars fought in Africa, including the
Biafran war, are traceable directly or indirectly to these very artificial
boundaries.3 For maintaining these inherited boundaries, African
countries, since independence, have paid a heavy price by way of
internal divisions and ethnic conflicts that no amount of domestic
"nation-building" has been able to overcome. Political restructuring
in Africa is not something limited to the ultimate solution of
correcting inherited artificial borders; it can also legitimately consist
of more mid-range techniques, such as power devolution, power-
sharing, cleaner or less corrupt governments, and intermittent
automatic review of national constitutions, say every ten years, that
can then be the prelude to border correction.
Scholars who have written about the African state all agree that
it does not provide a good framework for accomplishing the work of
national "development." Professor Clapham calls it "grotesque."3
Professor Mazrui refers to it as bondage of boundaries. 7  Mutua
analogized it to a jail and, alternately, as a terrorist organization
masquerading as a state, unable to inspire loyalty, which resorts to
massive human rights violations to hold power.138  The goal in
repudiating the permanence of Africa's present borders and
redrawing the map of the continent is "to construct viable states" in
place of the present mostly unviable countries. 139  Mutua foresees
little developmental future for the continent if it maintains its present
unviable borders. 4 °
132. Id.
133. See supra notes 57-60 and accompanying text.
134. See, e.g., JOHN J. STREMLAU, THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICS OF THE NIGERIAN CIVIL
WAR 1967-1970 273 (1977) (reporting the Tanzanian position that pointed to British
imperialism as "[tihe original villains responsible for the Nigerian crisis ...."); see
also Deng, supra note 10, at 255-56 (showing how British colonial policy in Sudan
sowed the seed for the civil war that has raged intermittently in the country for over
forty years).
135. Clapham, supra note 66, at 424.
136. Id.
137. Mazrui, supra note 50, at 28-30.
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Accordingly, Mutua proposes fourteen states, based on common
history, demography, ethnic similarities and alliances, cultural
homogeneity, and economic viability, in place of the current fifty or so
countries.1 4 ' For some of these scholars, it is not a matter of whether
these borders would be redrawn, but when. Thus, for example,
Professor Mazrui subtitles his article "Why Africa's Maps Will be
Redrawn" and talks about political conventions once considered
taboos and sacred cows, which in the past helped to preserve the
inherited borders, but since the 1990s have been undergoing
breakage. 14 These conventions include (1) enthusiasm for the unitary
state, (2) preference for a one-party state, and, of course, (3) integrity
of colonial boundaries.' They are now being displaced by direct
opposites, such as preference for federal systems, and an option for a
multi-party system, and related governmental features, which Mazrui
appropriately termed "great modifier[s] of boundaries"
4
Mutua's proposal is the most specific of all the formulations. The
problem with Mutua's proposal arises from the fact that it
accomplishes a redrawing of boundaries that entails solely a
combination of countries to form bigger states. Only two of the over
fifty countries in the continent, Algeria and Angola, will remain intact
the way they are today. The others will have their borders
reorganized into twelve republics. In other words, except for Algeria
and Angola, Mutua adopts a solution that essentially involves
combination of the present countries; no part of his proposal includes
separating different or incompatible ethnic-nationalities or peoples
now lumped together within countries. A comprehensive solution
would have to address both aspects of the problem, rather than be
limited mostly, as this one is, to creating larger or bigger countries.
Nothing betrays the weakness of the Mutua plan more than the
way his handling of Nigeria did. Nigeria is the wholesale creation of
British colonialism. 14' The country also has the worst of two worlds
when it comes to artificial borders. In creating the country, Britain
141. See id. (noting the identity and composition of the new states).
142. See Mazrui, supra note 50, at 28-30.
143. See Mutua, supra note 130.
144. Mazrui, supra note 50, at 29.
145. Philip C. Aka, The "Dividend of Democracy": Analyzing U.S. Support for
Nigerian Democratization, B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 225, 228 (2002); see also OSAGHAE,
supra note 10, at 1-30; see also Larry Diamond, Nigeria: The Uncivic Society and the
Descent into Praetorianism, in POLITICS IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: COMPARING
EXPERIENCES WITH DEMOCRACY 417, 419-64 (Larry Diamond et al. eds., 2d ed. 1995).
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both divided ethnic-nationality groups 46 and put incompatible groups
together. In his proposal, Mutua combined the country with eight
other countries - namely, Benin, Cameroon, C6te d'Ivoire, Equatorial
Guinea, Gabon, Ghana, Sdo Tom6 and Principe, and Togo - to form a
new state called "Ghana." With a population of about 130 million
people, this country is by far the most populous country in Africa and
one of the most populous countries in the world. Additionally, it is a
country housing three of the largest ethnic groups in Africa, Hausa-
Fulanis, Igbos, and Yorubas, who have a history before and since
independence of uneasy and often explosive co-existence.14 Each of
the triumvirate had a history of separate and independent existence
that goes back thousands of years before Britain forcibly lumped them
together in 1914. Each of the three also has a population that runs
into tens of millions, surpassing the population of many African
countries. Finally, the three ethnic-nationality groups collectively
make up an estimated two-thirds of Nigeria's population.' 4
Although leaving the country as it is would still conceivably not
be a useful solution, it is amazing that Mutua left Algeria and Angola
intact while combining an exceedingly diverse and complicated
country like Nigeria with nine other countries. Rather than leaving
Nigeria as it is or combining it with other countries, a more realistic
solution in "redrawing the map along African lines," to use Mutua's
words, would have been to constitute each of its major ethnic
nationality groups into a separate country. Each of the new countries
could then expand its borders to include relatives in neighboring
areas outside present-day Nigeria. Such expansion would apply to
Hausa-Fulanis, who could expand to incorporate their kith and kin in
the present-day Republic of Niger, and Yorubas, who could grow to
incorporate their kith and kin in the present-day Republic of Benin
and possibly farther into the Yoruba-speaking portion of Togo.149 To
talk of merging this very populous country needing division into
smaller entities, with nine other countries, as Mutua proposes, would
be carrying complexity beyond manageable proportions, given the
current state of technology and other features of many African
societies. 150
146. These divided ethnic nationality groups include Hausa-Fulanis, Tivs, and
Yorubas.
147. See Aka, supra note 7, at 220-21.
148. See Aka, supra note 145, at 228.
149. See Mazrui, supra note 50, at 29.
150. See Mutua, supra note 130, at 17.
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Briefly, the weakness in the Mutua plan derives from its author's
erroneous sense of the size of the states that will replace Africa's
current small and unviable countries. The plan limits size to
landmass, whereas size should have been seen as both a function of
landmass as well as of the number of people resident within a
territory. Nigeria ranks below many African countries in landmass,
including Algeria, Angola, Chad, Democratic Republic of Congo
(formerly Zafre), Libya, Niger, and Sudan. This understanding of size
is the only conceivable explanation why Mutua would leave Algeria
and Angola intact, as they are unattached to any other country.
However, Nigeria is an exceedingly populous country. Also, although
not the largest country in Africa, with a land area two times the size
of California,9'1 the country is equally quite large in geographic
landmass. Few would disagree with Mutua's suggestion that the task
of restructuring the inherited boundaries be turned over to a
continental organization, or failing that the task form the basis for
the continued existence of the OAU; from its formation, the
organization avowedly embraced the elimination of all vestiges of
foreign rule on African soil as a sole mission and its reason for being
arguably came to an end with the achievement of majority rule in
South Africa. 52 This is a reasonable suggestion with which few people
will find points of disagreement.
E. Attention to Collective (or Group) Rights.
Fifth, to promote human rights and reduce conflicts in Africa in
the new century, attention needs to be paid to both individual and
group rights and due recognition given to the relationship between
the two rights. Group rights need attention in the continent because,
as one scholar stated and the experiences of many groups in Africa
eloquently bear out, abusive state policies put groups at risk in the
continent.153  Proper attention to human rights in the continent
requires that the two rights go together. The salience of ethnicity in
African politics guarantees that the influence of group identities in
151. Nigeria, in GLOBAL STUDIES: AFRICA, supra note 76, at 52.
152. See Mutua, supra note 130. The OAU has since been replaced by a new
organization known as the African Union. See Rachael L. Swarns, African Leaders
Drop Old Group for One that Has Power, N.Y. TIMES, July 9, 2002, at A3.
153. Rhoda E. Howard, Group Versus Individual Identity in the African Debate on
Human Rights, in HuMAN RIGHTS IN AFRICA: CROSS-CULTURAL PERSPECTIVES, supra
note 21, at 159, 168.
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African societies will remain strong for a long time to come. 54 No
strategy for human rights promotion in the continent will succeed
that does not pay strong attention to group rights. In the words of
one germane study, "[p]romoting increased access to state power for
all groups is a human rights issue in [Africa]. Accomplishing this
purpose can also minimize opportunities for conflict that could result
in human rights violations." 5
F. Necessity for External Help
Lastly, Africa needs external material assistance to grow human
rights and reduce conflicts in the new century. Help is necessary for
political-civil rights - namely support for democracy 6 - but also
equally in socioeconomic rights. Two very pressing economic
problems with ramifications for all aspects of citizens' lives that the
continent faces are (1) HIV and AIDS; and, (2) the debt crisis or what
some people appropriately call the "debt overhang." These two
problems combine to form a double jeopardy that spells economic
catastrophe for many African countries. Western assistance toward
the growth of human rights is not a novel idea; as some Western
specialists on Africa advise, major states and international
organizations can become "active partners of governments in making
basic human rights part of the working foundations of contemporary
states.,57
Under President Olusegun Obasanjo, Nigeria has made debt
forgiveness an issue of domestic and foreign policy."5 Yet Nigeria is
better off compared to many African countries. The country has oil
and its debt burden, per capital, although still high," 9 is lower thanS• 160
that of many African countries.
154. See NAOMI CHAZAN ET AL., POLITICS AND SOCIETY IN CONTEMPORARY AFRICA 108-
18 (3d ed. 1999).
155. Aka, supra note 7, at 274.
156. See, e.g., Aka, supra note 145, at 225-79; see also Larry Diamond, Promoting
Democracy in Africa: U.S. and International Policies in Transition, in AFRICA IN
WORLD POLITICS: POST-COLD WAR CHALLENGES 250 (John W. Harbeson & Donald
Rothchild eds., 2d ed. 1995); see also John W. Harbeson, Externally Assisted
Democratization: Theoretical Issues and African Realities, in AFRICA IN WORLD
POLITICS, supra note 15, at 235-62.
157. AFRICA IN WORLD POLITICS, supra note 15, at 11.
158. See Aka, supra note 145, at 260.
159. Id. (noting that for a population estimated at over 120 million, the country has a
foreign debt of about $37 billion).
160. See CHAZAN, supra note 154, at 331-33 (covering the period up to the mid-1980s).
[Vol. 11.1206
CONFLICT RESOLUTION IN AFRICA
HIV/AIDS is a global health and security crisis. Over 140 nations
in the world now report confirmed cases of AIDS,'6 ' and the U.N. has
declared the fight against the pandemic a global responsibility. 62
However, HIV/AIDS is a pandemic that afflicts Africa, particularly
Sub-Saharan Africa, disproportionately. The region makes up only
about twelve percent of the world's population but has about five
times the world's outbreak of HIV and AIDS.163 "Africa has more HIV
and AIDS than the rest of the world put together."164 Seventy-seven
percent of the estimated three million deaths in the world from AIDS
in 2001 took place in Africa.'6 Of the 40 million people in the world
living with HIV/AIDS as of December 2001, 28.1 million were in Black
Africa. 166 Finally, twelve of the estimated thirteen million orphans in
the world who have lost their mothers or both parents to AIDS are in
Sub-Saharan Africa. 16 African countries need help combating AIDS
because "[i]f [they] are left to confront the ... pandemic with the
small level of outside support they have received to date, few are
likely to succeed and the spread of instability will heighten global
insecurity.2
1 68
In addition to forgiving the foreign debt of Black African
countries, especially those like Uganda and Zimbabwe where more
than ten percent of the population has AIDS, developed countries
should contribute generously to the U.N. AIDS fund. This is an issue
on which the U.S. can show leadership. Help to Africa in the fight
against HIV and AIDS is in U.S. national interest, not only because of
the severe impact the pandemic has on blacks and other minority
populations within the United States, but also because in an era of
globalization, national and international security are sometimes
161. Philip C. Aka, The United States Response to the International Campaign
Against AIDS in Africa, Address at the Chicago State University Model U.N.
Conference (March 18, 2002).
162. Salih Booker & William Minter, AIDS in Africa: Is the World Concerned
Enough?, in GREAT DECISIONS 2002 71, 77 (Jan. 2002), available at
http:/www.africaaction.org/action/aids2002.pdf (No state is an island when it comes to
AIDS, and there are no national fire walls.).
163. See Aka, supra note 161.
164. See id.
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better preserved using economic levers, in the manner of disaster
assistance, not via military techniques or means.169
To increase the chances for a lasting global peace in the post-Cold
War era, the developmental problems of African and other developing
countries must be tackled "with the intensity, creativity, and sacrifice
that marked the confrontation of the Cold War."170 Major powers need
to be concerned about the impact of the global system on weak states
least able to resist it, especially the materially poor, artificial states of
Africa. 71 The U.S. and other major powers worry that assistance to
African countries would be wasted through official corruption rather
than used for the problem the money was given. This is not an idle
concern given the vastness of official corruption in these and other
developing societies.'72 However, it is so easy to exaggerate the level
of governmental corruption in many of these extremely poor
countries. Rather than be a reason for complete stoppage of
assistance, donor countries could put necessary checks in place,
including imposition of certain necessary conditions, to ensure that
any aid provided is used for the purposes meant.
VI. CONCLUSION
The important question in the aftermath of the Cold War and
into the new century is what to do to reduce the levels of conflicts in
Africa to enable African governments to devote more of their time to
creating wealth than to managing conflicts. The answer is human
rights. A comprehensive human rights model based on democracy as
a political system and integrating human rights education, economic
progress, political restructuring, attention to collective or group
rights, and necessity for external help, as constituent elements has
been proposed. There is no suggestion here that bettering the
continent's human rights record will be the panacea for its conflict
resolution dilemma. However, taking human rights seriously will
produce significant reduction in the continent's currently high level of
conflict while helping to create the peace and goodwill necessary to
169. See Kurt C. Campbell & Thomas G. Weiss, The Third World in the Wake of
Eastern Europe, 14 WASH. Q. 96, 98, 104, 106 (1991).
170. Id. at 91.
171. CHRISTOPHER CLAPHAM, AFRICA AND THE INTERNATIONAL SYSTEM: THE POLITICS OF
STATE SURVIVAL 4 (1996).
172. See, e.g., CORRUPTION AND THE CRISIS OF INSTITUTIONAL REFORMS IN AFRICA (John
Mukum Mbaku ed., 1998).
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tackle and surmount the problem of artificial structures arising from
European colonialism.

